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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the laying down of the law in international and domestic 
arbitration. Interest centres on regulative and constitutive functions, and an analysis 
of realisation patterns of  regulative (directive) acts is reported. The focus is on the 
lin guistic realisation patterns of obligation, prohibition, and permission in terms of 
modal verbs and constitutive rules. 
The fi ndings show that the language of the law characteristically select patterns of 
directives which are specifi c to the legal domain. Face redress typically used in everyday 
communication as well as business interaction is not a device used in arbitration law. 
Moreover, the linguistic devices employed differ as regards different parts of the law. 
Modal verbs are typically applied for action rules, whereas constitutive rules are mainly 
reserved for stipulation rules and defi nition rules. 
The analysis offers a comparison of  Unicitral Model Law and domestic law. Finally, 
attention is paid to the adequacy of the chosen linguistic realisation patterns as regards 
simplifi cation/ easifi cation of legal expressions. The results are compared to those 
obtained in a previous study of Contract Law.    
1. Introduction
Many of the diffi culties lay persons are confronted with when compre-
hending legal written texts are due to syntactic complexity, such as sen-
tence length and use of nominalisations, a high frequency of passive 
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sentences, the use of complex conditionals and a high incidence of pre-
positional phrases (see Trosborg 1997: 14  for references).
Another source of diffi culty  is lexical complexity. Legal vocabulary 
exhibits distinctive features particular to expressing the concepts of 
law. Characteristic of the legal register are technical terms, common 
terms with uncommon meanings, archaic expressions, and formal items 
(see Danet 1985: 279-80). It is no wonder then that many studies of 
legal language have been concerned with syntactic and lexical features. 
For a very recent study of these aspects in Arbitration Law, see Engberg 
and Rasmussen (2003).
However, another area which has been of growing interest in the study 
of legal genres is pragmatics (see e.g. Gunnarsson 1984; Kurzon 1986; 
Bowers 1989). One aspect of particular salience is communicative acts 
(or rhetorical functions to use Trimble’s 1985 term) of legal English. 
Bowers (1989) has described the fi eld of a statute as follows:
The fi eld of a statute is that of a real social action which carries the 
whole weight of law in that it is constitutionally authorized. A public 
statute, whether it is declaratory, remedial, codifying, enabling, or 
penal is concerned with the conduct of social affairs and the granting 
of permissions or the imposing of obligations on members of the so-
ciety (Bowers 1989: 53, also quoted in Trosborg 1997: 27).  
As pointed out by Kurzon (1989: 288), very little work has been done 
in this fi eld. To fi ll this gap, Trosborg (1997) undertook a study of the 
genres of statutes and contracts in the domain of Contract Law focuss-
ing on communicative acts (speech acts) intended to modify/regulate 
social behaviour.
In the present paper, this approach is extended to the domain of Arbi-
tra tion Law. It analyses the regulative acts in Uncitral Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration with those observed in Arbitration 
Law of the People’s Republic of China. The purpose is to identify the 
regulative strategies fundamental to laying down the law in the domain 
of international arbitration and to establish their relative frequencies in 
Chinese Law in comparison with Uncitral Model Law.
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion was adopted by the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on 21 June 1985, at the close of the Com-
mission’s annual session. In its resolution 40/72 of 11 December 1985, The 
General Assembly recommended “that all States give due consideration 
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to the Model Law of International Commercial Arbi tra tion, in view of 
the desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures and 
the specifi c needs of international commercial arbitration practice” 
UNCITRAL p. 14).
The model law is “designed to meet concerns relating to the current 
state of national laws on arbitration. The need for improvement and 
harmonization is based on fi ndings that domestic laws are often inap-
propriate for international cases and that considerable disparity exists 
between them” (UNCITRAL p. 14).  
The Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (ALPRC) 
was adopted at the Ninth Standing Committee Session of the Eighth 
National People’s Congress on August 31, 1994. 
2.  Regulative acts in arbitration law
The laying down of the law is a declaration. In national law each sta-
tute is preceded by an enacting formula, for example, the so-called 
promulgation formula found in British statutes: 
“BE IT ENACTED by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and 
Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority 
of the same, as follows: (Minors’ Contract Law, quoted in Trosborg 
1997: 34). 
In the arbitration laws in question, no such enacting formula was ob-
serv ed. Neither was there any use of performative verbs, such as de-
clare (British English) or authorize, entitle and amend to be found in 
American statutes (Kurzon 1989: 24). 
There are three types of legislative rules (Gunnarsson 1984: 84, 
quoted in Bhatia 1994: 138-139):
Action rules are applicable to only a set of specifi ed descriptions of 
cases and are mainly meant to impose duties and obligations, to give 
rights, to prohibit actions, to assign power to certain members of bodies 
of the executive or other parties, or to state the law or just the penalties 
imposed on specifi c actions.
Stipulation rules defi ne the domain of application of a particular act 
or any section of it.
Defi nition rules are applicable to the entire Act and are primarily 
meant to provide terminological explanation.
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The regulation of behaviour in the laws examined was carried out by 
means of conferring rights, imposing obligations, stating prohibitions 
and outlining constitutive rules. These functions are described and 
exem plifi ed in the following.
2.1.  Permission
In legislation, permission issues from authority. The legislature grants 
permission to the body in question to perform certain acts; it does not 
order the body to do so, as is the case of statements of obligation. In 
Arbi tration Law, statements of permission serve to establish the rights 
of the arbitral tribunal and the parties of the confl ict. A typical rhetorical 
strategy is the use of the modal may, which functions as an indirect 
performative, as in the following examples:
The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any 
objection with respect to the existence in validity of the arbitration 
agreement. (p. 7)
The arbitral tribunal may require any party to provide appropriate 
security in connection with such measure. (p. 7)
If the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has 
juris diction, any party may request, within thirty days after having 
received notice of that ruling, the court specifi ed in article 6 to decide 
the matter, which decision shall be subject to no appeal. (p. 7)
May is the predominant illocutionary device used when conferring 
rights. A few examples made use of the expression be free to:
The parties are free to determine the number of arbitrators. (p. 5) 
The parties are free to agree on a procedure of appointing the arbi-
trator or arbitrators, subject to the provisions of paragraph (4) and (5) 
of this article. (p. 5)
Even the expression grants freedom to was observed:
It grants the parties the freedom to choose the applicable substantive 
law, which is important in view of the fact that the number of national 
laws do not clearly or fully recognize that right. (p. 19)
Furthermore, may also occurred in examples where the act of permission 
is dubious:
An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause 
in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement. (p. 4)
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Such statements belong to the category of stipulation rules and are 
better classifi ed as constitutive rules.
The verbs could and need not were each observed only once in the 
UNCITRAL data:
As regards the term “commercial”, no hard and fast defi nition could 
be provided. (p. 15)
… the award need not be signed by the arbitrators at the same place. 
(p. 20)
Here the function is that of defi nition and stipulation, respectively.
In ALPRC there was one instance in which the modal can was used to 
express possibility:
If… , a ruling can be made by default. (p. 7)
Can was not used to regulate behaviour in UNCITRAL.
2.2.  Obligation
Statements of obligation used to regulate behaviour have the illocu-
tionary force of orders. Only one instance employing the performative 
verb oblige was found:
Modelled on article II(3) of the 1958 New York Convention, article 
8(1) of the Model Law obliges any court to refer the parties to arbi-
tration if seized with a claim on the subject matter unless it fi nds that 
the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed. (p. 17)
Typically the modal shall expresses obligation in legal acts. This use 
of shall, referred to as “mandatory shall” is not only endowed with the 
meaning that the subject shall do X, it also carries the implication that 
if he/she doesn’t, there will be sanctions. Examples of shall to impose 
obligation are: 
The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such 
rules of law as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance 
of the dispute. (p. 10)
If, during arbitral proceedings, the parties settle the dispute, the arbi-
tral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings, and, if requested by the 
parties and not objected to by the arbitral tribunal, record the settle-
ment in the form of an arbitral award on agreed terms. (p. 10)
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Statements of obligation may be in the active voice as above, or they 
can take the form of passive constructions:
The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given 
a full opportunity of presenting the case. (p. 8)
The award shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the arbi-
trator or arbitrators. (p. 10)
A number of statements employing the modal shall were not used to 
impose obligation but rather had the function of stipulation rules. These 
are listed and exemplifi ed under constitutive rules. 
The modals must and have to are typically used to express obligation 
in conversational English, but in legal contexts they are rarely observed. 
Must did not occur in ALPRC at all, and it was observed only three 
times in UNCITRAL: 
An application for setting aside under article 34 must be made within 
three months of receipt of the award. (p. 20)
The award must be in writing and state its date. It must also state the 
reasons on which it is based, unless the parties have agreed otherwise 
or the award is an award on agreed terms,… (p. 20)
The verb have to occurred in neither.
Other modals expressing obligation are should, ought to and need.  
Whereas ought to was not observed at all, the modal should occurred 
three times in UNCITRAL and three times in ALPRC:
It should be noted that article 24(1) deals only with the general right 
of a party to oral hearings… and not with the procedural aspects such 
as length, number or timing of hearings. (p. 18)
The term ”commercial” should be given a wide interpretation. (p. 3)
These instances are listed in article 6 as functions which should be 
entrusted …to a specially designed court or … (p. 16)
It should be noted is a fi xed phrase and the two other examples express 
stipulation rules.
In ALPRC, the modal should occurred in examples like the follow-
ing:
 The arbitration commission director shall decide whether an arbitrator 
should withdraw… (p. 6)
The arbitration tribunal may also decide on its own whether the on-
going arbitration process should be started anew. (6)
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The modals should and ought to are “weak” indicators of obligation, 
which explains their infrequent use in Arbitration Law.
The modals will and would were not observed in ALPRC, whereas 
will occurred three times and would four times in UNCITRAL, both 
with the function of stipulation or prediction: 
The vast majority of situations commonly regarded as international 
will fall under this criterion. (p. 15)
… but guarantees the reader and user that he will fi nd all instances of 
possible court intervention, except for matters not regulated by it … 
(p. 16)
Especially foreign readers and users, who constitute the majority of 
potential users and may be viewed as the primary addressees of any 
special law on international commercial arbitration, will appreciate 
that they do not have to search outside this Law. (p. 16)
The conditions set forth in this paragraph are intended to set maximum 
standards. It would, thus, not be contrary to the harmonization to be 
achieved by the model law if a State retained even less onerous con di-
tions. (p. 13)
It is advisable to follow the model as closely as possible since that 
would be the best contribution to the desired harmonization and in the 
best interest of the users of international arbitration, who are primarily 
foreign parties and their lawyers. (p. 14)
According to article 1(2), the Model Law as enacted in a given State 
would apply only if the place of arbitration is in the territory of that 
State. (p. 16)
Insofar as… the provision would apply irrespective of whether the 
request is made to a court of the given State or of any other country. 
(p. 17)
So far, it appears that only the modal shall is used to impose obligations 
on people. When the other modals with regulative meaning occur, they 
are mainly used to express stipulation rules. Insofar as these modals 
were infrequent in use, anyhow, in Arbitration Law, they are listed 
under obligation and not in a separate category. With regard to the use 
of  legal shall, the predominant function was regulation in action rules. 
There were, however, a substantial number of  shall´s which were 
used to defi ne domain of application or even to provide terminological 
explanations. These are analysed as a separate category of constitutive 
rules.    
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2.3.  Prohibition
The regulation of behaviour can also take place by issuing prohibitions, 
but this device is infrequent in use compared with statements of obli-
gation. Prohibition is used in examples like “No person shall…”; “No 
court shall…”. Additionally, shall + negation is used to state rules 
according to which a given law operates:
In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except 
where so provided in this Law. (p. 4)
This law shall not affect any other law of this State by virtue of 
which certain disputes may not be submitted to arbitration or may be 
submitted to arbitration only according to provisions other than those 
of this Law. (p. 3)
2.4. Constitutive rules
Statements which do not include performative verbs, or modals which 
function as implicit performatives, may still serve the purpose of regu-
lat ing behaviour. This applies to English legislative texts as well as 
conversational English.
Sentences used to explain or defi ne expressions and words in the statute 
or to supply information concerning the application of the statute, or 
part of it, are constitutive rules (Kurzon 1986: 23). In UNCITRAL and 
ALPRC, unmarked statements outlined constitutive rules concerning 
defi nition rules and stipulation rules. A typical indicator  of defi nition 
rules is the verb mean, but also words such as defi ne, constitute, and be 
are found:  
“arbitration” means any arbitration whether or not administered by a 
permanent arbitral institution; 
“arbitral tribunal” means  a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators; 
“court” means a body or organ of the judicial system of a State;  (p. 
3)
The model Law defi nes an arbitration as international if “the parties 
to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of that 
agreement, their places of business in different States” (article 1 (3)). 
(p. 15) 
“Arbitration agreement” is an agreement by the parties to submit to 
arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may 
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arise between them in respect of a defi ned legal relationship, whether 
contractual or not. (p. 4)
The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration 
clause constitutes an arbitration agreement provided that… (p. 5)
A typical indicator of stipulation rules is the verb apply; other indicators 
are have, include, be deemed to, be intended to, ensure: 
This Law applies to international commercial arbitration, subject to any 
agreement in force between this State and any other State or States. 
(p. 2)
If…, an arbitrator withdraws from his offi ce or a party agrees to the 
termination of the mandate or of an arbitrator, this does not imply 
acceptance of the validity of any ground referred to in this article or 
article (12(2). (p. 7)
Such an award has the same status and effect as any other award on 
the merits of the case. (p. 10)
… such agreement includes any arbitration rules referred to in that 
agreement; (p. 3) 
Any written document is deemed to  have been received if it is deliver-
ed to the addressee personally or it is delivered at his place of business, 
habitual residence or mailing address. (p. 4)
… his mandate terminates, if he withdraws from his offi ce or if the 
parties agree on the termination. (p. 6)
The conditions set forth in this paragraph are intended to set maxi-
mum standards. (p. 13)
… the Model Law ensures, by providing a set of suppletive rules, that 
the arbitration may commence and proceed effectively to the reso lu-
tion of the dispute. (p. 17)
Other verbs observed in constitutive statements are: is given, exists, 
envisages, is stated, guarantees, deals with, follows closely, recognizes, 
expresses, etc. There is no sharply defi ned distinction between defi nition 
rules and stipulation rules. Furthermore, many rules classifi ed as consti-
tutive rules go far beyond defi nition and stipulation and are part of the 
law per se regulating people’s behaviour. 
A special category of constitutive rules are those involving the modal 
shall. Here we fi nd that the typical indicator of obligation in action rules 
is in fact also used in stipulation rules:  
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The award shall state the reasons on which it is based, unless the 
par ties have agreed that no reasons are to be given or the award is an 
award on agreed terms under article 30. (p. 10)
The award shall be deemed to have been made at that place. (p. 10)
The interpretation shall  form part of the award. (p. 11)
The provisions of article 31 shall apply to a correction or interpretation 
of the award or to an additional award. (p. 11)
… which decision shall  be subject to no appeal. (p. 7)
This agreement or determination, unless otherwise specifi ed therein, 
shall  apply to any written statement by a party, any hearing and any 
award, decision or other communication by the arbitral tribunal. (p. 
8)
In arbitral proceedings with more than one arbitrator, the signatures of 
the majority of all members of the arbitral tribunal shall suffi ce, prov-
ided that the reason for any omitted signature is stated. (p. 11)
3.  Results and Discussion
The individual results of the analyses appears in Table 1 for UNCITRAL 
and Table 2 for ALPRC, and Table 3 shows the comparison of the two. 
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Regulative Acts in Uncitral Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
Cat. I  Constitutive  rules 
 (unmarked strategies) 38.7                                                              
 shall 6.5  45.2 
                                                                                   
Cat. II  Permission (rights)
 be free to 1.2
 may 19.8
 need not 0.4
 could 0.4 21.8
Cat. III Obligation
 Oblige 0.4                                                         
 shall  25.3
 will  1.2
 would  1.5
 should 1.1
 must  1.1  30.6
 
Cat. IV Prohibition
 shall not  1.2
 may not  0.8  2.0    
Table 1
Regulative Acts in Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China
 Cat. I  Constitutive rules
    (unmarked strategies)  11.7
     shall    9.9 21.6
 Cat. II Permission (rights)
    may   22.2
     can 0.6  22.8
 Cat. III Obligation
  shall  51.2
   should  1.9 53.1
 Cat. IV Prohibition  
  shall not  1.9




As it is shown in Table 3, the fi ndings for the two laws are very similar 
on Cat. II Permission statements (21.8% vs. 22.8%), amounting to a 
little above 1/5 of all strategies employed. The results are also very 
similar for Cat. IV Prohibition, which was very low on both laws (2.0% 
vs. 2.5%). However, when  looking at  Cat. III Obligation, it is apparent 
that strategies imposing obligation are the most frequent strategy used 
in ALPRC amounting to more than half the strategies used (53.1%). In 
comparison, UNCITRAL only has 30.2% strategies in this category. 
For Cat. I Constitutive rules, it is the other way round. These strategies 
are used in UNICITRAL with a frequency of 45.2% compared with 
only 21.6 % in ALPRC. These fi ndings need to be explained.
As regards Cat. III Obligation, UNCITRAL employed the widest 
range of modals (shall, must, will, would, should) even though it had 
the lowest score on this category, whereas ALPRC mainly employ ed 
mandatory shall (51.2%) (see Tables 1 and 2). This points to a predo m-
i nance of the use of shall in ALPRC. This tendency is also evident in 
Cat. I Constitutive rules, where ALPRC employs shall in 9.9% of the 
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strategies used in comparison with 6.5% in UNCITRAL. This fi nding 
is observed despite the fact that as a total UNCITRAL has the double 
number of constitutives compared with ALPRC. 
There is then less variety in the use of strategies (modals as well as 
constitutive rules) in ALPRC compared with UNCITRAL. This points 
to a “playing-it-safe” strategy used in ALPRC with the modal shall as 
the predominant marker in regulative acts.
To allow for a comparison of the results of the analysis of regulation 
in UNCITRAL with those obtained for Contract Law (Trosborg 1977), 
Table 4 shows the individual results of Contract Law and Table 5 com-
pares the two laws. 
Regulative Acts in English Statutes (Contract Law)
   Cat. I Constitutive rules
     (unmarked strategies)  39.3
      shall  14.5
      are to 7.1 60.9
   Cat. II Permission (rights)
      May  8.9 8.9
   Cat. III Obligation
      Performatives 1.2
      Shall 6.9
      should/ought to 3.0
      other 6.4 17.5
   Cat. IV Prohibition
      Cannot  8.3




The predominance of Constitutive rules is even greater here. In Con-
tract law, this category amounts to  60.9 % compared with 45.2% in 
UNCITRAL. Mandatory shall is used only with a frequency of 6.9% 
against 25.3% in UNCITRAL. This points towards an increase in the 
use of mandatory shall across the three kinds of law counterbalanced by 
a decrease in the use of constitutive rules.   
With regard to the use of legal shall in constitutive rules, a decrease 
was observed from Contract Law to UNCITRAL (14.5% vs. 6.5%). 
There was, however, an increase on this category when the fi ndings of 
ALPRC was compared with those of UNCITRAL (9.5% vs. 6.5%).
The corpus of Contract Law included laws written between 1960 and 
1987, whereas UNCITRAL dates from 1985 and ALPRC from 1994. 
The time factor may have played a role in the selection of regulative 
strategies. The fi ndings point towards a shift away from a predominance 
of constitutive rules observed in both Contract Law and UNCITRAL to 
a predominance of legal shall in ALPRC.
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The use of shall in constitutive rules needs to be commented on, 
as it has been criticised by a number of researchers. Bowers (1989) 
fi nds that shall is inappropriate in expressions where there is no agent. 
Stipulations of the kind it shall be lawful and it shall de deemed 
should be in the modal-less form of statements – simply it is lawful 
and it is deemed. Thus legal shall should be avoided in constitutive 
rules and in regulatives where no agent is present in explicit form or 
recoverable from context. The use of shall as the appropriate expression 
of a re g u lative with agent (explicit or recoverable) is recommended by 
Child (1992). At the same time she warns against the use of shall to 
express constitutive rules (referred to by her as “future tense”). She 
has emphasized the importance of “saving” shall for orders, and warns 
against the misuse of shall referred to as the “false imperative”. 
Shall is the most powerful word in the legislative arsenal. It must not 
be squandered by misuse. Shall must not be wasted by being used to 
put verbs in the future tense. The future tense is seldom needed in 
statutes for a legislative act applies to the everpresent present. (Child 
1992: 205, quoted in Trosborg 1997: 137) 
As an example of a false imperative, she mentions “It shall be a felony 
to commit murder”. Assuming that the law is presently in effect, the 
accurate phrasing is: “It is a felony to commit murder”.
According to Child, overuse of shall is a common error among 
novice drafters. They fi nd it unnatural to write in the present tense while 
thinking of the future. The drafter must learn to think in terms of the 
time when the statute is read. If this is done, the present tense comes 
easily and “those invaluable shalls are saved for their proper use” (to 
give an order). 
A comment is needed regarding the use of the modal must. In 1989, 
Eagleson writes that some lawyers are now moving to replace shall 
with must in their documents when an obligation is being imposed or 
mandatory conduct is prescribed (p. 76). This claim is made to avoid 
confusion for the clients (not familiar with “legal shall”) who would 
be likely to interpret shall as expressing mere futurity. The urge to use 
must is supported by e.g. Bennet (1989) and Elliott (1990), whereas, 
for example, Child (1992) argues against the use of must to impose 
obli gation. 
The use of must to express obligation was not observed in Contract 
Law, neither was it found in ALPRC, and it was only used with a low 
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frequency in UNCITRAL (1.1%). Thus the recommendation to use 
must to the exclusion of mandatory shall has not gained ground in legal 
drafting.  
Finally, there was an increase in ALPRC compared with UNCITRAL 
in the use of legal shall to the exclusion of other modals, and of unmarked 
constitutive rules, in particular. As mentioned, this can be explained as 
a strategy of “playing it safe”. Drafters adhere to the powerful force of 
legal shall and  tend to overuse it even in constitutive rules.
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